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Abstract  
 
Scholarly attention on political advisers has grown steadily in recent years. Research has focused on 
issues of accountability, core executive studies, policy work and classification of policy making 
roles, as well as the role of advisers as the third prominent party in the politics administration 
interface. While empirical research on national administrative systems, especially Westminster 
ones, has increased, we know less on those individual agents in ministerial cabinet systems, and 
very little in supranational administrations, especially the EU. The aim of the proposed paper is to 
investigate the policy making roles of advisers in European Commissioners’ cabinets. Who are 
those actors and what do they do? Are they a case of agents active in a politicised policy advisory 
system, such as the ones found in ministerial cabinets or is their involvement in the policy process 
more in line with the particularities of the European Commission politico-administrative context? 
To answer those questions we put forward a comparative study design and a mixed data collection 
method, using both a survey questionnaire and interviews. The study shows that the EC cabinet 
system shares important similarities, but also differences with national ministerial cabinet systems. 
EC cabinets work as ‘professional offices’ in a supranational politico-administrative setting that is 
significantly less politicised and conflictual than in national ministerial cabinet systems. EC 
advisers appear to be politically aware experts, though not necessarily specialists, who indulge both 
in the technical, as well as the steering side of policy, while their policy advice activities have a 
strong horizontal, intra-executive, but also governance dimension.   
 
 
Keywords: political advisers, ministerial advisers, policy advisers, ministerial cabinet systems, 
policy advisory systems, ministerial advisers, political staff 
 
 
Introduction 
 
While in many Western-European countries the ascend of political advisers is a relatively recent 
phenomenon, in countries with ministerial cabinet systems such as France, Belgium, Greece, Italy, 
and Portugal there is a tradition of engaging ministerial cabinets, as the structural interfaces 
between politics and administration. Ministerial cabinets comprise numerous political advisers who 
as trustees of the minister are in a superior position in relation to the senior civil service, and 
constantly put pressure on the civil servants in order to ensure political responsiveness. The 
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ministerial advisers are endowed with crucial policy-making roles and in some cases colonise all 
stages of the policy process. In comparison, the career civil servants at the top of the administration 
in some cases, is considered to be marginalized in the policy-making process.  
 
It has been argued that the exception to this rule is the European Commission (Kassim et al 2013, 
Wille 2013, Bauer and Ege 2013). There seems to be wide agreement that the 1999 Prodi - Kinnock 
reform of the Commission administration normalised relations between the EC cabinets and the 
Commission high civil service by redefining the roles of cabinets and drawing “sharper lines of 
responsibility between cabinets and services” (Wille 2013, p. 98). This was argued to be the result 
of the establishment of codes of conduct, the denationalisation of cabinet composition and the 
reduction of the recruitment and selection powers of EC cabinets. As Bauer and Ege (2013, p.193) 
argued at the start of the millennium, the Kinnock reform, which implemented crucial changes in 
strategic and personnel management, led to “an ever less politicised Commission administration, in 
an ever more politicised organisational context”. The Commission today pays more attention on 
effective management of the policy making process, as it is “focused on delivering a Europe of 
results” (Wille 2013, p. 116).  
 
The above findings make the Commission the only cabinet system with apparently non-conflictual 
politico-administrative relations. The contribution in hand makes use of a work in progress on the 
policy analytical roles of EC cabinet advisers to analyse the roles and particularly the policy making 
roles of those agents. It is innovative in two ways. First, following Bauer and Ege’s (2013, p. 178) 
suggestion, the current contribution aims to refocus scholarly interest away from national 
administrations to a supranational administration, where attention on many issues has been arguably 
scarce. Second, much like Wille (2013, p. 97-119) has done in his study of chefs de cabinet, we too 
focus on the role of individuals, departing from traditional analyses of cabinet structures, as well as 
analyses of the politico-administrative interface (Cini 2006, Donelly 1993, Donelly and Ritchie 
1994, Ritchie 1992, Kassim et al 2013). The focus here is on EC core cabinet advisers’ policy 
making roles and activities. These are the actors who perform policy advisory work within the EC 
cabinet structure. They are the cabinet insiders. The question here is what is the nature and role, 
particularly the policy making role of those agents? To what extent is the ministerial cabinet system 
impacting upon EC advisers’ work? And what can be said of their work within the EC cabinet 
politico-administrative context?  
 
Our overall disciplinary objective here is to catch up with empirical and theoretical developments 
deriving from work on advisers carried out on Westminster systems.  We achieve this in two ways. 
First, we contextualise advisers’ work by describing the EC cabinet system and presenting 
similarities and differences with other such systems. Second, we assess and classify EC cabinet 
advisers’ involvement in policy making, using existing typologies from the relevant literature. 
 
In order to achieve our research goal we collected data through questionnaires and interviews with 
EC core cabinet advisers. As the research is a work in progress with more questionnaires and 
interviews expected, the present paper presents the preliminary findings, based on data collected till 
mid July 2014. Not disregarding the two exploratory interviews with one Commissioner and a 
Policy Assistant, the data in hand refer to a sample of 16 advisers, who completed the questionnaire 
survey, three of who also gave us a follow up interview.  
 
We present our material as follows. First, we present our theoretical and methodological 
framework. We then proceed to describe the context in which advisers operate: the cabinet and its 
relation with the high civil service, the European Commission Director Generals and Directors. 
Third, we map EC advisers’ policy making roles. Finally, we conclude with a summary and 
discussion of our findings.  
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2. Theory and methods 
 
2.1 Theory  
 
The analysis of the policy role of political advisers is ridden with certain challenges. The first such 
challenge relates to the fact that when we examine “the policy role of partisan staff there are 
elements of both individual agency and structure to consider” (Maley 2013, p.2). Except for 
influential actors, advisers can also be seen through the lens of the functions of the institutions in 
which they are embedded, or the networks and groups of which they are members. To put it simply, 
the context and location of their work matters.  Indeed, it is not possible to treat advisers in isolation 
(James (2007, p. 9). Their work is conditioned by the functions of the civil servants alongside 
whom they work. Three models have been suggested: a) advisers work alongside a neutral civil 
service (Westminster systems, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands), b) advisers work alongside 
a civil service, where the bureaucracy’s top tier is also politicised (Spain and the Slovak Republic), 
c) advisers work in ministerial cabinets (France, Belgium, Italy, Greece, Portugal and increasingly 
Spain) (James 2007, p. 9, OECD 2011, p. 23). The EC cabinet advisers belongs clearly to the latter 
case. In ministerial cabinet systems we would expect advisers’ policy roles to be streamlined with 
what appears in the literature to be certain major ministerial cabinet system functions: intra-
executive coordination, expertise in the sense of establishing “brain trusts” that pool expertise 
together, flexibility in terms of organisation, loyalty, technical expertise combined with political 
feasibility (Walgrave et al 2007, p. 9, De Winter 1981, p. 66, Brans and Steen 2007). Equally, we 
would also expect to observe cabinet advisers’ roles being associated with certain dysfunctions 
ministerial cabinet systems project, such as conflictual politico-administrative relations due to their 
partito-cratic functions, rampant politicisation, partisan affiliations and an embedded culture of 
mistrust of the civil service (Walgrave et al 2007, Erally 2001, Vancoppenolle 2011).  
 
The second challenge in studying advisers’ policy roles reflects the nature and dimension of the 
policy work those actors undertake: a) advisers undertake multiple tasks, b) their policy work is 
highly variable and c) their work can also be highly contigent (Maley 2013, p. 1,2,3). It is for this 
reason that many scholars reject the classification of the policy work of advisers using types, on the 
basis of surveys that aggregate responses in order to rank and weight aspects of advisers’ work 
(Maley 2013, p.2). Not disregarding the merits of such an approach, our argument here is that the 
use of classifications allows us to escape the fallacy of a non-comparative, “atheoretical” study. 
Classification is a “necessary component of systematic comparison”, though, of a higher level than 
contextual description, since “it seeks to group many separate descriptive entities into simpler 
categories” (Landman 2003, p. 4, 34). In the present study, we classify advisers according to 
Connaughton’s (2010a, 2010b) four types. This is the first, and up to today most established, 
scholarly attempt to classify advisers’ policy making roles.  
 
According to Connaughton (2010a, 2010b) there are four types of adviser: Type I is the expert, who 
is a specialist, politically passive, works on a specific policy field using knowledge, the impact of 
his work being expertise. Type II is the partisan who is responsive to the minister’s mission, highly 
political in all dimensions and closely associated with the minister, his impact being political 
dominance. Type III is the coordinator who is a generalist, politically variable (active or passive), 
provides oversight to the government program and acts as a fixer, his impact being management. 
Type IV is the minder who is a generalist but also responsive to the Minister. Unlike the Partisan 
who is a ‘party apparatchik’, the Minder is the minister’s bodyguard (Connaughton 2010a, p. 63) 
politically active, looking “for issues potentially harmful” to the political executive (Connaughton 
2010b, p. 351-352). The impact of the minder is mutuality. Figure 1 below depicts the four types 
and their characteristics.  
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Figure 1: Characteristics of advisers roles. Source Connaughton (2010b, p. 352) 
 
 
 
Arguably, Connaughton’s (2010a, 2010b) typology is not without problems. Some of these have 
been summarised by Craft (2011). First, advisers’ roles appear to be overlapping and not exclusive. 
Second, there is no consideration of the horizontal and vertical dimension of advice, though 
Connaughton (2010b) does analyse her data along a horizontal and vertical dimension. Third, there 
is no focus on the content of advice. Fourth, there is no understanding of the exact stage of the 
policy cycle where advisers’ role is more prominent. Overall Craft (2011) argued that there is a 
need for greater specificity. This specificity can be pursued either through an alternative typology or 
by simply focusing on covering the above mentioned gaps. Craft (2011) did suggest an alternative 
classification of policy advise giving activities along substantive and procedural lines (Craft 2011). 
The substantive dimension refers to the nature of policy advice activity and it is discerned between 
technical/administrative and partisan advice. The procedural dimension refers to the horizontality of 
policy advice giving activities and it is discerned between vertical (intradepartmental) and 
horizontal (inter-departmental / governance).  
 
Figure 2: Adviser policy advice activity. Source Craft (2011) 
 
 
However, this typology never took off, and attention was refocused more on classifications 
according to content of advice, rather than policy roles (Craft and Howlett 2012). Moreover, as it 
has been recently argued, despite being a commendable classification, it projected many more 
limitations than the original Connaughton (2010a, 2010b) one (Gouglas 2013a, 2013b, 2014). In 
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particular, trying to avoid overlapping and non-exclusive roles it created ideal types into which 
empirical data proved difficult to fit without losing even more specificity.   
 
Staying within the realm of policy advisory roles, then, there are two immediate ways in which one 
can cover some of the gaps evident in Connaughton’s typology, and as a result achieve an even 
more systematic interpretation of advisers’ policy advice activity. First, following Craft’s (2011) 
suggestion, adviser’s policy work can be located in the policy cycle heuristic. Howlett, Ramesh and 
Perl (Howlett et al 2009) point to five stages of the policy cycle: i) agenda setting, ii) policy 
formulation, iii) decision making, iv) policy implementation, v) policy evaluation. We will be using 
those in order to locate at which stage EC cabinet advisers’ work is more prominent. Second, 
greater attention needs to be paid to the dimension of advisers’ policy advice giving activities. We 
argue in this paper that the best way to achieve a deeper understanding of the dimension of 
advisers’ policy work is by employing Maley’s (2013) concept of three arenas. According to Maley 
(2013, p.1) “it is useful to understand the policy work of partisan staff as occurring in three different 
arenas: working with the department; working with other ministers (within the political executive) 
and working with stakeholders”. In each of the above arenas advisers’ roles have a different 
character and purpose. In some of them policy activities are part of a core part of advisers’ work, 
arising from the institutional dynamics and context in which this work is embedded. In others, 
advisers’ work is seen as an opportunity, rather than as responsibility. In the case of Australia, the 
first and second arenas come up as core policy work dimensions. Working with the department 
means supervising, orienting and mobilising departments, generating ideas, developing and 
implementing policy. Working within the executive means facilitating decision making, resolving 
policy conflict and coordinating new policy. The third arena comes up as more of an opportunity 
rather than as a responsibility. This is where ideas are linked to interests and opportunities, 
mobilisation and bargaining in terms of building political support takes place, and policy is 
delivered (Maley 2013, p. 4-15). Given that intra-executive co-ordination is an important function 
of ministerial cabinet systems we would expect the first and second arenas to be the loci of the core 
part of advisers’ policy roles.   
 
 
2.2 Methods   
  
The present contribution was designed as a single case comparative study focusing on the European 
Commission. It is comparative, not only thanks to the use of classifications, which allow for 
meaningful comparisons across systems, but also because we do actually draw direct comparisons 
with other ministerial cabinet systems. The focus of the study is both institutional, as well as 
individual. Data on contextual information (institutional focus) regarding EC cabinets was collected 
using primary documents, and secondary scholarly analyses. Interviews were used to corroborate 
findings existing in the bibliography. However, our main focus and unit of observation has been the 
European Commission cabinet adviser (individual focus). Data on advisers were collected in two 
stages. First, we took a snapshot of the official internet profiles of advisers employed during the 
February - May 2014 period, just before the end of this Commission’s term in office. This allowed 
us to get an initial picture of certain fundamental parameters of this population, such as official 
position in the Cabinet, gender balance, average total cabinet staff size, average core cabinet size, 
total EC cabinet staff employed. Parallel to this, we proceeded with two exploratory, non-recorded 
informational interviews in April 2014 with one Commissioner and one policy assistant. The choice 
was made simply on the basis of access. The second and main stage of our data collection started in 
the aftermath of the European Parliament elections. In mid June 2014 we distributed our 
questionnaire through personal email to 135 EC Cabinet advisers. Out of 229 core cabinet advisers, 
they were the only ones with public emails. Nine Commission cabinets do not provide the emails of 
their members publicly. The questionnaire, comprising 19 closed and open questions, is similar to 
the one distributed for the research on Greek ministerial advisers (Gouglas 2013a, 2031b, 2014). 
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The idea behind this is to make the findings between advisers across ministerial cabinet systems 
more directly comparable. The intention is to replicate this questionnaire also to Belgian advisers. 
Till mid July 2014, 16 EC cabinet advisers had completed the questionnaire and three of them gave 
us access for interviews. The three interviews were recorded. As this is a work in progress, more 
completed questionnaires and interviews are expected and already coming through. The sample in 
hand in this paper comprises 16 advisers, of 14 different nationalities, 9 female, 7 male, out of 
which one ‘Head of Cabinet’, 3 ‘Deputy Heads’, 2 ‘Advisers’ and 10 ‘Members of Cabinet’. They 
represent 8 different Commissioner cabinets. 12 out 16 of the samples’ advisers have previous 
policy work experience in the EU institutions, out of whom 10 in the European Commission. They 
are all highly educated with 12 of them at master and 3 at PhD level. Their major field of education 
is law (7), and political science (4). Some of our sample’s advisers (3) have a combination of study 
fields: engineering with political science and economics, political science with economics, 
economics with law.      
 
  
3. The European Commission cabinet 
 
The European Commission cabinets form part of a supranational executive with certain 
characteristics that make it unique in comparison to national executives and administrations 
(Donelly 1993, p. 74-75). The members of the College of Commissioners are not elected in direct 
elections on the basis of a specific political program, though there is increasing pressure for this to 
change, as we witnessed in the 2014 European Parliament elections, where candidates selected by 
the European Political Parties run for the Commission Presidency. Moreover, the Commission is 
not characterised by a particular political ideology, as most political parties would understand the 
term, while there is no party organisation or central political patronage mechanism cementing 
government cohesion, as is the case at the national levels (Donelly 1993, p. 74-75). Added to those 
executive government features, the Commission administration is often portrayed as deeply 
fragmented (Cram 1994). Fragmentation is the result of deep coordination deficits, which are based 
on the inherent characteristics of each level of organization: on the one hand, DGs are thought to 
form small ‘fiefdoms’, accomplishing their duties in an introspective way and pursuing their own 
agendas; on the other hand, the Commission is composed of persons with no shared background, 
ideology or sense of common fate to bind them. In view of this, the majority of studies 
acknowledge the particular politico/administrative context and the hybrid character of the 
Commission as an organisation (Peterson 2006). Keeping this in mind we proceed with locating EC 
advisers within their institutional habitat, the EC cabinet. 
 
3.1 From Hallstein to Prodi: from private, to political to professional offices 
 
In 1958 the new European Commission (EC) established private offices for the Commissioners, 
following the pattern of the French ministerial cabinets (Ritchie 1994, p. 98). Such offices had 
already been in use by the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 
having been encouraged by Jean Monnet as institutions that could promote a dynamic and fluid 
system of policy advice (Ritchie 1994, p. 99). However, the very idea that “every commissioner 
should have the support of a small personally appointed staff” was initially proposed by Emile 
Noel, the first EC Secretary-General (Cini 1996, p. 112). The logic behind this proposal was the 
improvement of both horizontal and vertical co-ordination within the Commission (Cini 1994, p. 
112). Indeed, as the policy competences of the EU grew in the 1960s, Cabinets became an 
“important mechanism for co-ordinating policy within the Commission” (Donelly and Ritchie 1994, 
p. 42). Planning and co-ordination was indeed the main focus of cabinets in the 1970s and early 
1980s (Cini 1996, p. 115) Beyond co-ordination, though, it has been argued that EC cabinets were 
“originally created to emphasize the political role the Commission was to play in the creation of 
European political Union” (Cini 1996, p. 115). In his attempt to foster a European identity, the first 
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Commission President, Hallstein, expected all Commissioners to maintain a high profile and visit 
member states accompanied by their members of cabinet, while “on occasion, [they] sent their 
cabinet members as delegates”  (Donelly and Ritchie 1994, p. 41). More importantly, cabinets 
became “increasingly instrumental in building policy majorities and package deals across 
Community institutions and with the Member States” (Cini 1996, p. 115). This was particularly 
evident in framing the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). As Donelly and Ritchie (1994, p. 42) 
argued it became “particularly apparent in the early years of the Community that for a policy to be 
successful it had to be vigorously negotiated with politicians, civil servants and interested parties in 
the Member States”.  
 
It goes without saying that with the establishment of cabinets came along a series of problems 
associated with typical cabinet system drawbacks. The first such challenge was cabinet size. At 
first, under pressure from Commission President Hallstein, it was agreed to keep the cabinets small, 
at four persons: two members plus a secretary and a typist (Donelly and Ritchie 1994, p. 42), 
whereas the President’s cabinet would consist of four advisers and two secretaries. By 1972 the 
average cabinet staff number increased from an average of four to fourteen, out of which six in high 
administrative grade. By 1995 cabinet size reached seventeen, of which nine in high grade. In total, 
in 1995 the Community budget allowed for 310 staff for 20 cabinets (Cini 1996, p. 113). Beyond 
size, a second problem that came to the fore was political pressure, exercised due to national 
affiliation of cabinet members. EC cabinets were often identified as ‘British’ or ‘German’. This 
occurred despite conventions to employ at least one non-national member of cabinet, (Cini 1996, p. 
113). The increasing importance of nationality and national allegiance reflected in cabinets was one 
of the factors leading to a third challenge, that of politico-administrative friction. One issue of 
course was the presence of different working practices among members of cabinet and Director 
Generals of differing nationality (Cini 1996, p. 114). A broader issue had been the very functions of 
cabinets and how those impacted on the Commission administration. In relation to their national 
liaison function, “the cabinet became a pressure point for national interests and a focus for the 
accommodation of national and Community interest” (Ritchie 1994, p. 103). In relation to their 
policy advice and co-ordination function there was “an increasing pressure [to the Commission 
DGs] to achieve a consensus on policy issues” (Ritchie 1994, p. 103). Even in the field of 
promotions and appointments of DG officials, the early cabinets played a crucial role in trying to 
get their nationals placed in the right jobs (Ritchie 1994, p. 103). The situation did not 
fundamentally change, not even after the introduction of competitive examinations for recruiting 
officials in 1962.  
 
The problems between the cabinets and the Commission administration were highlighted for the 
first time in the Spierenburg Report (1979). The report drew attention to the proliferation of cabinet 
members, making special reference to dangers such as “reducing the morale of the civil service and 
creating a barrier between the Commissioner and the DGs” (Donnelly & Ritchie 1994, p.43). These 
concerns were not taken on board and EC cabinet advisers came to be increasingly regarded as 
constituting a shadow bureaucracy having ‘too many pimply boys with too much power’ (Wille 
2013 p. 100). When in 1999 the Santer College collapsed under allegations of corruption, the new 
Commission President, R. Prodi set the goal of making cabinets smaller and more multinational. 
Much like the Copernicus reform in 2000 in Belgium, the Kinnock-Prodi reform was an attempt to 
radically restructure strategic and management practices in the European Commission. However, 
unlike Belgium, where Brans and Steen (2007) argued “cabinets were re-invented”, in the case of 
the EC it has been argued that relations were “normalised” moving away from the private offices of 
the early Commission (1958-1962) and the political offices of pre Prodi - Kinnock reform period, to 
the professional offices of today (Wille 2013, p. 102).  
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3.2 Post Prodi political-administrative relations 
 
After the Prodi – Kinnock reform there seems to be wide scholarly agreement that political-
administrative relations at the EC level are not as dramatic as described in the literature before the 
reform, and definitely not as conflicting as those at the national level (Egeberg and Heskestad 2010, 
Kassim et al 2013, Wille 2013, Bauer and Ege 2013, ).  
 
A cabinet member expressed the following opinion, which seems to be shared across most cabinet 
members: 
 
‘[…] although the cabinet system is inspired by the French administrative tradition, we do also 
have borrowed elements from the British system, in the sense that we consider the institution of civil 
service to be ‘sacred’. We completely respect the bottom-up approach, i.e. the fact that it is the civil 
service that capture, initiate and execute policies […] What the cabinets do is filtering the ideas of 
the services’. 
 
[Interview Respondent 1] 
 
“For us, good working relations with the DGs are a key to success. If you engage in a conflictual 
relationship, then you will have more problems than necessary. So, it is in the interest of the EC to 
establish a good working relationship. However, I am not sure if this presupposes a depoliticized 
Commissioner. In fact, good relations presuppose two things: first, loyalty of the DG, i.e. respect to 
the political decisions taken; second, respect to the technical expertise of the DGs, on the part of 
the Commissioner. As you can see, it is a double-way street, but, again, I do not think that the 
Commissioner has to be depoliticized. He/she is a political person who gives the strategic vision 
and guidance and then needs to put it into place. In order to implement it, the loyalty of the civil 
service is needed.” 
 
[Interview Respondent 3] 
 
Nevertheless, this is not to say that pressure for political responsiveness does not exist.  
 
‘[…] we occasionally have to ‘tame’ the over-ambitious proposals coming from the bureaucratic 
apparatus, which sometimes does not take into account crucial contextual factors and implications  
 
Moreover, conflict and internal upheaval is also part of the relations between EC cabinets and 
DG’s. This is how an adviser described interaction with the EC administration:  
“Internal upheaval sometimes happens, this is not always bad. I think the rules are very clear. 
There are some things that the Commission is politically responsible for and, also, there are 
hierarchical relations. I cannot tell anybody in a DG to do anything, as it is the Directors-General 
that tell them. If he/she does not agree with what we tell, he/she can speak to the Commissioner. 
This is the theory. In practice, the Commissioner is just a person, just like the Director-General. We 
cannot channel everything through them. So, our role is to keep in touch with people who do the 
work. Obviously, if they don’t like what we are telling them, he can do it in their own way, but still 
they have to do it. However, they sometimes raise the issue on a high level and then we discuss the 
issue both with the DGs and the Commissioner. In most cases this does not happen. If I see that 
something does not work or happen at all at the DG level, I can discuss it with other people, or even 
the Commissioner. This is not a threat, but people at the DGs know that when they speak to me, they 
also speak, in the long run, with the Commissioner. Generally speaking, though, it is not my 
responsibility. This is where hierarchy [DG] is present.”  
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Despite some tension, a fundamental difference to other cabinet systems is that EC cabinets do not 
command and control the administration in the same way that this found in cabinets forming 
shadow administrations, as is the case of Greece or Belgium (Gouglas 2013, Brans and Steen 2007). 
 
What explains this normalisation of political-administrative relations in the Commission? To begin 
with, since 1999 we observe the drafting of Codes of Conduct from the President’s office. The 1999 
Prodi Code of Conduct (1999, p.2) governing relations between the Commissioners and their 
departments (DGs) made clear that they “…should be based first and foremost on loyalty and trust”, 
introducing certain guidelines for cooperation between the cabinets and the services. Such 
guidelines, setting the framework of co-operation between Commissioners’ cabinets, Commission 
services and other EU institutions, have been common since then. In his note to the new 
Commissioners in 2010, Barroso made clear that “They [Members of the Commission and Director 
Generals concerned] work together in a  spirit of loyalty and mutual assistance, in keeping with 
their respective powers ... The cabinet does not involve itself in the direct management of the 
services, which is the exclusive responsibility of the Director-General” (Communication from the 
President 2010, p. 150. As important as they may be, though, such normalisation of PA relations in 
the Commission is arguably not simply a matter of codes of conduct. 
 
Wille’s (2013, p. 115, 116) thesis on the “normalisation of the commissioners’ cabinets” portrays a 
gradual historical evolution from cabinets as private offices, to cabinets as political offices and 
finally to professional ones. This is due to their denationalisation, but also to a greater focus on 
effective management of the policy making process, “focused in delivering a Europe of results”. 
The denationalisation argument, as a source of decreasing politico-administrative tension, comes up 
in the literature by most authors. Kassim et al (2013) have argued that the Prodi and Barroso 
reforms made EC cabinets more ‘European’ and less national in composition, with tangible effects 
on their relations with the administration. The EC cabinets are seen as having undergone a process 
of ‘functional denationalization’, triggered jointly by the reforms, the expansion of the College with 
the 2004 and 2007 enlargement, and the growing range of the EC responsibilities. As a result, 
Kassim et al (2013) argue that EC cabinets today tend to focus more on the policy portfolio of their 
Commissioner and less on impetuses emanating from national capitals. In other words, their role as 
a channel through which the Commissioner home state pursues its interests has significantly waned 
(Kassim et al, 2013). 
 
Beyond denationalisation, it has been argued that the Kinnock reform with its new highly 
formalised recruitment and selection management system significantly reduced direct politicisation 
(Bauer and Ege 2013, p. 181-187).  In contrast to the eighties, it is now much harder for loyalists to 
occupy top administrative positions. At the same time professional politicisation, that is the 
responsiveness of the Commission administration to the political requirements of their job has 
increased (Bauer and Ege 2013, p. 187-191). The Commission is a “political organisation” and the 
Commission officials can be viewed as “political bureaucrats” (Bauer and Ege 2013, p. 188). This 
appears to follow a trend towards greater political responsiveness on behalf of the College of 
Commissioners. It is claimed that the increasing importance of the European Parliament (EP) in the 
European system has a major impact on the political leadership of the EC, as the College has 
become more politicized and centralized in its quest to address a variety of political interests and to 
guarantee the adequate leadership required by the Commission’s increasingly political role (Bauer 
& Ege, 2013). In this sense, the authors describe the EC as a system with an ever less politicized 
civil service, in an ever more politicized organizational context.  
 
 
3.2 EC cabinets: organisation and advisers’ status 
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In terms of formal organisation, EC cabinets do not fundamentally differ to the pre-Kinnock reform 
ones or to those in other ministerial cabinet systems. On top there is the Head of Cabinet (chef de 
cabinet), followed by the Deputy Head (deputy chef) and the Members of Cabinet, which may come 
under this very position title, or may be titled ‘Advisers’ or ‘Experts’ in case “they are very senior 
in terms of experience, age or professional position” and ‘Personal or Policy Assistants’ in case 
they are “more junior” [Interview Respondent 1]. This constitutes the so called core cabinet. Next 
to the core cabinet stands the rest of the cabinet, comprising Administrative Assistants, but also 
Spokespersons, Press Officers and (in some cases) interns (stagiaires).  
 
As is usually the case with all known ministerial cabinet systems, the internal division of labour is 
flexible with the Commissioner and the chef de cabinet deciding on how to make use of their staff. 
As a result the formal job position presented above, make up only an initial indication of who has 
the status of an adviser and actually performs advisory duties. Our snapshot of the EC cabinet staff 
employed in May 2014 shows that on the one hand senior executive secretaries may be assigned the 
title of ‘Member of Cabinet’. More often, though, it is ‘Personal/Policy assistants’, the ones who 
despite having an assistant staff contract (AST), happen to hold a substantial advisory portfolio. As 
a cabinet member pointed:  
 
“there is flexibility … one would expect AST’s not to have leading roles, but it is often the case that 
they have an auxiliary role, while at the same time also following important portfolios of other 
cabinets”  
 
[Interview Respondent 1] 
 
This is similar to what has been observed to be the case in Greece, where the ‘Metaklitoi’ (usually 
an administrative support staff employment status) can be found to perform advisory duties and 
hold de facto an adviser status (Gouglas 2013a, 2013b, 2014). In France, a similar divide exists 
between ‘Membres de Cabinet’ and the ‘Fonctions Support’ (Gouglas 2014). In view of this, the 
present study focuses on EC cabinet staff, who perform advisory duties independent of official 
position title. These make up the de facto core cabinet advisers.  
 
3.3 EC cabinets: size, composition, recruitment  
 
The thrust of the Prodi – Kinnock Reform in relation to the EC cabinet system was that it formally 
reduced the maximum number of cabinet members, from nine to six per Commissioner, while it 
also insisted on the multinational character of every cabinet, “including at least three nationalities, 
apart from that of the commissioner” (Wille 2013, p. 101). In addition, all Commissioners are 
required to appoint a head or deputy head from a member state other than their own. Finally, the 
achievement of a gender balance became also a formal constraint to modern Commissioners.  
 
It is debatable whether the new regime led to a significant decrease in the number of total cabinet 
staff in the whole of the Commission. It did, however, result in a stabilisation of cabinet size. We 
saw above that in 1995 the budget allowed for 310 total cabinet staff (including administrative 
support) in 20 Commission cabinets. In 2014 we counted a total of 621 cabinet staff in 28 
Commission cabinets. This is more than Belgium’s 564 total cabinet staff in 18 cabinets in March 
2014 (Brans, De Visscher, Gouglas forthcoming). But it is much less than Greece’s 1,200 in 2012, 
not to mention France’s 2,903 staff in 39 cabinets in 2012 (Gouglas 2013a, Économie et Finances 
2013, p. 9). As far as the number of core cabinet advisers is concerned, in May 2014 this stood at 
229 in comparison to a much higher number in Belgium, at 448, and a much higher number in 
France, at 525 (Brans, De Visscher, Gouglas forthcoming, Économie et Finances 2013, p. 9). The 
average number of core cabinet advisers stood at around 8, while the average total cabinet size 
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stood at 22, if we include the bigger cabinet of the President (40) and that of the Commissioner for 
Foreign Affairs (36), and at 21 if we exclude those two residual cases.  
 
Table 1: Comparison of cabinet size 
Cabinet Sytem 
Number of 
Cabinets 
Total Number of 
Cabinet Staff 
Total Number of 
Advisers 
Average 
total 
cabinet 
size 
Average Total 
number of 
advisers per 
cabinet 
Belgium Snapshot 
March 2014 18 564 448 29.7 18.5 
European 
Commission 
snapshot May 2014 28 621 229 22.2 8,2 
France Snapshot 
August 2012 39 2903 525 74.4 13.5 
Greece snapshot 
December 2012 37 Est. 1200 NA 32.4 
Statutory 9 
minimum to 34 
maximum 
4 Special Advisers or 
Sp. Associates 
5 Scientific Associates 
(5 or 10 or 14 or 30)  
 
It has been argued that the new regime has been more successful in denationalising commissioners’ 
cabinets than reducing their size. As Egeberg and Heskestad (2010) showed the composition of 
cabinets is highly multinational marking a significant break with the past. In 2004, 96% of the 
cabinets were made up of more nationalities than prescribed by the rules. However, we need to 
point out that certain EC cabinets do still project a certain ingenuity in evading the new restrictions. 
This is evident in an internal note distributed by Commission President Barroso to the then new 
Commissioners. In that note it is underlined that many cabinets are still too nationally oriented. 
(Wille 2013, p. 94). Finally, regarding gender balance, though the difference is not huge, we 
observe that in our population snapshot of May 2014 men with 128 advisers overtake women who 
count 101 advisers.   
 
Regarding the rules pertaining the composition of EC cabinets a member of cabinet commented: 
 
“I think that the rules are properly implemented. At least this is what I would conclude by looking 
at the cabinets around me. Regarding gender balance, though it is not really about a one-by-one 
mathematics, we have many women in leading positions here in the EC.” 
 
[Interview Respondent 3] 
 
 
Beyond nationality, Spence (2006, p.65) pointed out that “EC cabinets are usually a mixture of 
internal EC staff, seconded to the cabinet for the Commission’s five-year term, and ’outsiders’, on 
secondment from national administrations or the private sector”. The insiders are usually 
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Commission officials, who typically see the passage through a Commissioner’s cabinet as a key for 
a successful further career in the EC. As regards the outsiders, they are appointed directly by the 
Commissioner, on the basis of a contractual arrangement. In our sample of advisers, the vast 
majority, 12 out of 16 have had previous policy work experience from work within the EU 
institutions.  
 
Table 2: EC cabinet advisers' previous policy work experience 
Previous work experience description 
Anti-Trust case officer 
 
Administrator in one of the Commission's department 
 
Was working in a DG in the Commission.  
 
 
Head of Unit in the European Commission  
Adviser to a previous Commissioner, Case officer DG COMP, 
Desk Officer in DG ENTR 
 
Commission Official in Commissioner's DG 
 
Head of Unit  
 
MEP assistant 
 
Council secretariat official 
 
Policy Officer (Economics) 
 
DG Political Officer, Political Advisor European Parliament 
EU official for 10 years 
 
 
3.4 Non cabinet advisers: ‘Special Advisers’ 
 
Parallel to every EC cabinet we occasionally observe the presence of ‘Special Advisers’. According 
to Article 5 of CEOS a ‘Special Adviser’ is ‘a person who, by reason of his/her special 
qualifications and notwithstanding gainful employment in some other capacity, is engaged to assist 
one of the institutions of the Communities, either regularly or for a specified period’. ‘Special 
Advisers’ are persons of exceptional qualifications and/or relevance, quality and level of the 
professional experience and expertise acquired prior to or while performing the duties of special 
adviser. Normally, ‘Special Advisers’ are relatively older compared to the core cabinet advisers, 
while they have also worked, or are still working, in very prestigious posts. They may be in paid or 
non-paid duty and in most cases they are assigned parts of the portfolio that are technical in nature 
and, therefore, require high-level skills for their analysis. In the Barroso Commission in May 2014, 
there were employed 50 ‘Special Advisers’ in total, their numbers ranging to none for certain EC 
Cabinets (Digital Agenda) to 4 for the Commission President to a maximum of 6 for Economic and 
Monetary Affairs. Overall 18 out of 28 Commissioners have appointed ‘Special Advisers’. As those 
agents are outside the official cabinet structure and at times work part time or without pay, we 
decided not to include them in the current investigation.  
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“Special advisers are not cabinet members. They usually are very experienced ‘outsiders’. For 
example, we have a special adviser who has worked for forty years on a certain part of our 
portfolio. He probably knows more than the entire unit on this issue. Once or twice a year, we call 
this expert in in order to have an internal brainstorming and extract certain political messages. We 
therefore form a sort of think tank on the issues the Commissioner has a special interest in. These 
contacts have a very formal character.” 
 
[Interview Respondent 3]   
 
4. Inside the cabinet: advisers and policy making 
In the following section we focus on the details of advisers’ involvement in policy making. We start 
by using the stages heuristic to locate advisers’ activities to the discrete stages of the policy cycle. 
We then proceed with classifying advisers according to Connaughton’s (2010a, 2010b) 4 adviser 
types, based on policy making roles. We proceed by analysing the dimension of advisers’ policy 
advice giving activity using Maley’s (2013) three arenas.  
 
4.1 Advisers and the policy cycle 
 
Advisers were asked to point out the exact stage of the policy cycle where they thought they spent 
most of their working time. As is the case with Greek ministerial advisers their role is particularly 
pronounced at the front end of the policy cycle, with 13 advisers out of 16 claiming to participate in 
agenda setting every day, while 10 claimed to participate in policy formulation daily and 4 at least 
once a week. In addition, similarly to Greek ministerial advisers, the majority of EC cabinet 
advisers in our sample appear to spend much of their time trying to put solutions into effect (9 daily 
and 3 at least once a week). However, in contrast to the Greek advisers, EC Cabinet advisers appear 
to spend more time in decision making (9 out of 14 on daily basis). On the other hand, EC Cabinet 
advisers appear to be less active in evaluating and monitoring policy with only 3 of them claiming 
to be spending time at this stage on a daily basis and 4 at least once a week, while 6 claim to only 
occasionally spend time in monitoring results. The more pronounced role of the Greek ministerial 
advisers at the evaluation and monitoring stage is explained, not by any more technical focus of 
their work, but by their profile as policy managers who steer and fix policy (Gouglas 2013a, 2013b, 
2014 forthcoming). Overall, it may be argued that the findings on frequency of time spent at the 
various policy cycle stages, are consistent with a central feature of all ministerial cabinets, which is 
that as the institutional habitats of advisers they enjoy a central role in the “design, formulation, 
implementation and evaluation of public policy” (James 2007, p. 17).  
Table 3: EC cabinet advisers and the policy cycle 
Policy Cycle Stage Never A couple 
of times 
per year 
 
Once a 
month 
 
Once a week Daily 
Recognizing problems - 
setting agenda priorities  
0 (0%)  0 (0%) 2 (12.5%) 1 (6.3%) 13 (81.3%) 
Proposing Solutions and 
formulating policies 
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (12.5%) 4 (25%) 10 (62.5%) 
Deciding on the 
preferred course of 
action  
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (12.5%) 3 (18.8%) 11 (68.8%) 
Putting solutions into 
effect 
0 (0%) 1 (6.3 %) 1 (6.3%) 4 (25%) 8 (50%) 
Monitoring results  0 (0%) 3 6 (37.5%) 4 (25%) 3 (18.8%) 
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(18.8%) 
 
4.2 A classification of policy advisory roles 
We now proceed in classifying EC Cabinet advisers according to the four policy advisory roles 
suggested by Connaughton (2010, 2010b, 2013): the expert, the partisan, the coordinator and the 
minder. We achieve this by using collected data on policy expertise, primary job functions, 
frequency of activities undertaken and frequency of tasks performed. The aim is to describe the 
main characteristics of advisers’ roles, suggested as important by the typology: profile (specialist, 
generalist or responsive), politics (active, passive or variable), communication (technical, political 
or both), policy making (knowledge, politics or fixer) and impact (expertise, political dominance, 
management or mutuality). Where data exists we triangulate our questionnaire findings with 
interview material.      
Profile 
Is the profile of the EC cabinet ministerial adviser that of a specialist, a generalist or is it simply 
responsive to the minister’s mission? As the typology suggests, a specialist is a qualified expert in a 
specific policy field relevant to a ministry’s competencies, not a technical expert in a certain domain 
of competence.  In view of this, we asked advisers to describe whether, according to the work they 
do in the Cabinet, they felt they fit in more appropriately to the role of a generalist or that of a 
specialist. Based on their answers, the majority, 11 respondents out of the 16 of our sample, 
describe themselves as generalists and only 5 as specialists. Given that ministerial cabinet system 
advisers have been described as conforming principally to the expert type, as opposed to the 
strategic adviser found for instance in the UK or the assistant / aide found for instance in Denmark, 
the above finding appears puzzling (Schreurs et al 2010). It needs not be. The majority of the 
advisers of our sample do project a high level of expertise, be it in terms of level of education 
(figure 4) or in relation to previous experience from working at the EU institutions (table 1 above), 
especially the European Commission.  
Figure 3: Level of education 
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However, as Walgrave, Caals, Suetens and De Swert (2004, p.13) have argued for the case of 
Belgian ministerial cabinet advisers, “specialist expertise can only be assessed on the basis of the 
departmental stability of the MC activity”. In their study of Belgian advisers from 1970 to 1999, 
they found that members of cabinets, despite their high expertise “do not show much homogeneity 
in the ministerial portfolios they serve” (Walgrave et al 2004, p.13). Ministerial cabinet advisers are 
not devoted in one policy branch, the one of their expertise, but alter positions frequently, 
demonstrating a high level of competence mobility. It may be argued that what we also observe in 
the case of EC Cabinet advisers, as with Greek and Belgian ministerial advisers, is this phenomenon 
of experts who are at the same time competence shifters.      
As a member of cabinet stated  
“I, despite being an expert in competition law, was asked to follow the economic crisis” 
[Respondent 1]  
Policy Making 
Is the EC Cabinet adviser a fixer, facilitating the oversight of the ministry’s agenda? Does the 
policy role of this actor rely on knowledge or politics? Or is the EC Cabinet adviser policy passive, 
simply minding the minister? In order to understand this we asked advisers to point and rank what 
they consider to be their three primary job functions. Additionally, we asked them to state the time 
spent in certain activities and tasks. As was also the case with Greek ministerial advisers, the data in 
hand reveal that EC Cabinet advisers are highly policy active. However, a fundamental difference to 
Greek advisers is that EC cabinet advisers appear to be equally active in both the steering, as well as 
the technical side of policy advice giving.   
To begin with, in order to shed light into advisers’ policy making activities, we asked them to point 
and rank what they consider it to be their three primary job functions. As advisers usually carry out 
multiple and overlapping functions the objective here was to reflect this very reality. In contrast to 
the Greek policy manager, who primarily appears to administer and manage projects, the EC 
Cabinet adviser appears to be more focused on the provision of strategic advice. 10 out of the 14 
advisers of our sample rank provision of strategic advice as their number one function, while 4 
advisers rank this as their second to top primary job function. All in all 14 out of the 16 advisers in 
our sample rank the provision of strategic advice within their top three primary job functions. This 
is followed by 8 advisers ranking advice on political considerations within their three top primary 
job functions. In particular, 5 advisers rank it as their second to top primary job function, while 3 
advisers rank it as their top function. We need to stress at this point that the other 8 advisers in our 
sample do not rate advice on political considerations at all. This result pointing to a variable 
political role is in line with what we saw to be the case with Greek ministerial advisers too and will 
be further analysed further below. Finally 9 advisers rank “liaising with the European Commission” 
within their top three primary job functions. In particular, 7 advisers rank it as their third to top 
primary job function, while two of them rank it as their second to top primary job function. This in 
turn arguably reflects a main function of the EC cabinet system, which is to provide intra-executive 
political and policy co-ordination. But what is then the deal with the more technical aspect of policy 
making? 7 advisers in our sample rank involvement with the “nuts and bolts of policy” within their 
three top primary job functions, while 9 of them do not rank it at all. Evidently policy details appear 
to come up as important, but not as the most important job functions. 
Beyond ranking their primary job functions, we asked EC Cabinet advisers to indicate the 
frequency of performing certain broad activities and then tasks (Table 3). While slightly less than 
half of the advisers in our sample do not perceive their involvement in the nuts and bolts of policy, 
as well as everyday management, to be their primary job function, the frequency of time spent in 
such activities tells a different story. 15 out of the 16 person sample of EC cabinet advisers appear 
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to spend much of their time in coordination and management, out of whom 11 on a daily basis. 
Moreover, 12 of them also appear to spend much of their time also in policy technicalities, out of 
which 6 on a daily basis.   
In relation to time spent in specific activities we observe that the agents of our sample do not spend 
much time in media and communication. This is consistent with the perception they have of their 
primary job function, but also of the very fact that EC Cabinets have separate communication and 
media units performing such tasks. In relation to time spent in political activities, the answer is 
again consistent with their perception of their primary job function. 11 advisers out of the 14 in our 
sample state that they perform advising activities related to politics daily (5) or once every week 
(6).     
Table 4: Frequency of activities undertaken by EC Cabinet advisers (%), n = 14 
Activities Never  Several 
times per 
year  
Once a 
month  
Once a 
week  
Every day  
Policy Technicalities 
(drafting or processing 
laws, researching, 
formulating solutions 
etc) 
0 4 (25%) 0  6 (37.5%) 6 (37.5%) 
Coordination and 
Management 
(of policy work, the 
Cabinet Staff, Civil 
Servants) 
0 0 1 (6.3%) 4 (25%) 11 (68.8%) 
Politics 
(Party, MPs, Minister’s 
electoral district, 
Networking) 
4 (25%) 0  1 (6.3%) 6 (37.5%) 5 (31.3%) 
Media and 
Communication 
4 (25%) 4 (25%)  1 (6.3%) 5 (31.3%) 2 (12.5%) 
 
The data on frequency of tasks performed (see table 4) also shows that EC Cabinet advisers appear 
to be focused on steering tasks, as well as the nuts and bolts of policy making within their 
department.  
Table 5: Tasks undertaken by EC Cabinet advisers and their frequency (%), n= 14 
Tasks Never Rarely Occasionall
y 
 
Frequentl
y  
 
Very 
frequently 
 
Ask officials to provide memos or 
advice  
0  0 1 (6.3%) 8 (50%) 7 (43.8%) 
Assist with budgetary matters  5 
(31.3%) 
7 
(43.8%) 
3 (18.8%) 1 (6.3%) 0  
Attend meetings with Europe 
Commission’s DG Civil Servants to 
discuss the nuts and bolts of policy 
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 3 (18.8%) 8 (50%) 5 (31.3%) 
Broker meetings with interest groups   0 2 5 (31.3%) 7 (43.8%) 2 (12.5%) 
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(12.5%) 
Convey or clarify Commissioner’s 
wishes 
0 0 (0%) 0 4 (25%) 12 (75%) 
Meet with MEPs  0 3 
(18.8%) 
10 (62.5%) 2 (12.5%) 1 (6.3%) 
Analyse and Evaluate implemented 
Policy 
0 1 (6.3%) 5 (31.3%) 8 (50%) 2 (12.5%) 
Meet advisers from other EC cabinets 0 0 0 7 (43.8%) 8 (50%) 
Meet with other EU institutions 
officials to coordinate policy  
0  1 (6.3%) 9 (56.3%) 4 (25%) 1 (6.3%) 
Write press statements 6 
(37.5%) 
2 
(12.5%) 
4 (25%) 4 (25%) 0 
Raise new policy initiatives with the 
Commissioner 
0 0 4 (25%) 10 
(62.5%) 
2 (12.5%) 
Read & comment on the 
administration’s (DGs) advice 
0 0 1 (6.3%) 8 (50%) 7 (43.8%) 
Represent the Commissioner in 
internal meetings  
0 0 2 (12.5%) 11 
(68.8%) 
3 (18.8%) 
 
Represent the Commissioner in public 
events 
0 3 
(18.8%) 
8 (50%) 5 (31.3%) 0 
Write speeches 2 
(12.5%) 
6 
(37.5%) 
2 (12.5%) 6 (37.5%) 0 
Receive external delegations on the 
Commissioner’s behalf 
0 0 7 (43.8%) 7 (43.8%) 2 (12.5%) 
Prepare policy files and memos 0 1 (6.3%) 0 7 (43.8%) 8 (50%) 
Monitor the implementation of policy 0 3 
(18.8%) 
5 (31.3%) 7 (43.8%) 1 (6.3%) 
Produce evidence and facts in support 
of policy making 
1 (6.3%) 6 
(37.5%) 
3 (18.8%) 5 (31.3%) 1 (6.3%) 
Other (please specify) 
 
     
 
On the steering side, all advisers of our sample claim to frequently (7) and very frequently (7) ask 
officials to provide memos or advice on specific policy issues. 11 advisers claim to frequently (7 at 
least once a week) and very frequently (4 on daily basis) attend meetings with EU Commission 
DG’s civil servants to discuss the nuts and bolts of policy. Virtually all of them spend time meeting 
advisers from other cabinets, though the majority, 9 advisers, rarely or occasionally meet with other 
EU institutions officials in order to coordinate policy. Finally, half of them frequently and very 
frequently monitor the implementation of policy (7). It is evident from the data in hand that much 
like Greek ministerial advisers, EC Cabinet advisers spend much time in performing policy steering 
tasks.  
On the more technical policy side the majority of EC Cabinet advisers appear to read and comment 
on departmental advice frequently (4) and very frequently (5), analyse and evaluate implemented 
policy frequently (7) and very frequently, prepare policy files and memos frequently (5) and very 
frequently (7). Almost half of our sample’s advisers (6) spend time in producing evidence and facts 
in support of policy making, though 8 appear to never, rarely or occasionally spend time in 
producing evidence and facts in support of policy making (8). Where advisers spend the least time, 
as is the case with Greek advisers, is assisting with budgetary issues. 10 advisers stated that they 
never or rarely assist with such issues. 
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Overall (table 5), in relation to the policy dimension of Connaughton’s typology, it may be argued 
that EC Cabinet advisers, unlike their Greek counterparts, do not share the perception of working as 
policy managers, but rather as strategic advisers who also advice on political considerations and 
liaise with other parts of the Commission. However, much like their Greek counterparts, EC 
Cabinet advisers appear to be highly active in policy steering. A fundamental difference between 
the two groups of agents is that an equally big majority of EC Cabinet advisers appears to be more 
frequently involved (daily or weekly) in a wide range of policy technicalities and tasks.  
As an interviewee put it 
“Members of cabinet study and examine issues on behalf of the Commissioner, they explain, help 
him take a decision. They are experts, but can also be specialists. The coordinator is the Chief of 
Cabinet”.  
 
[Interview Respondent 1] 
 
Table 6: EC cabinet advisers' policy making roles 
Top 3 Primary Job 
Functions 
Activities once a 
week and daily 
  
Tasks performed  once a week and daily 
Strategic advice 
14 (1
st
 and 2
nd
) 
 
Advice on political 
considerations  
8 (2
nd
 and 3
rd
 choice) 
But half do not rank 
it 
 
Steering 
 
Liaising with the 
Commission 
9 (7 as 3
rd  
choice) 
 
Technical  
 
Nuts and bolts of 
policy 
7 (3 as 1st, 1 as 2nd 
and 3 as 3rd) 
 
 
  
Steering 
Coordination and 
Management: 15  
 
Technical 
Policy 
technicalities: 12 
 
 
Steering 
15 ask officials to provide memos or advice 
on specific policy issues.  
15 meet advisers from other cabinets 
 
Technical 
15 prepare policy files and memos 
15 appear to read and comment on 
departmental advice 
10 analyse and evaluate implemented 
policy 
9 monitor the implementation of policy  
6 spend time in producing evidence and 
facts in support of policy making,  
 
Steering & Technical 
 
13 attend meetings with EU Commission 
DG’s civil servants to discuss the nuts and 
bolts of policy 
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Politics 
Is the EC Cabinet adviser’s political role active, passive, or variable? From a ministerial cabinet 
system perspective we would be inclined to assume that EC Cabinet advisers would have a highly 
active almost partisan political role. However, given the sui generis nature of the European 
Commission as a political institution, as well as post the Prodi – Kinnock reforms affecting the 
Commission politico-administrative system, we would also be inclined to assume that this role, 
especially its partisan dimension would be weak in comparison to the typical ministerial cabinet 
systems. The data in hand confirms those two assumptions.   
To begin with, the EC cabinet adviser in our sample is evidently neither a ‘party apparatchik’, nor a 
partisan of a national cause. When asked to point to the most important skills an adviser must 
possess to fulfil one’s duties  the majority of advisers in our sample claimed that same ideology and 
political preferences with the Commissioner appear to be of little importance with 9 advisers 
appearing to consider this not at all or least important. Even less important appears to be having the 
same nationality as the Commissioner, with 15 advisers claiming this is not at all (12) or least 
important (3).  
As argued by a member of cabinet during our interview, the last type of adviser to be found in an 
EC Cabinet is the partisan.  
“… however, we are less partisans. This is because, in our case, the Commissioner is not going to 
return (to her constituency). Even her appointment was not based on party affiliations but rather on 
her popularity and expertise. So we generally do not have to do much on this field. Of course, some 
of my colleagues are assigned to monitor the [national] media and the situation in the [country] 
because she is [nationality] and wants to be aware of these things”. 
[Interview Respondent 2] 
According to another member of cabinet:  
“Commissioners usually do bring one single partisan, responsible for constituency work back 
home, but this is usually it”. 
[Interview Respondent 1] 
Being not partisan does not mean that EC cabinet advisers are politically passive. We saw above 
that half of the advisers in our sample consider the provision of advice on political considerations as 
one of their primary job functions. Furthermore, as depicted in table 3 above, 11 / 16 advisers claim 
they are frequently or very frequently involved in activities of a political nature. This is further 
supported by data on frequency of political tasks undertaken (Table 6).  
Table 7: Frequency of political tasks performed 
Tasks Never Rarely Occasionally 
  
Frequently  
  
Very frequently 
  
Convey or clarify 
Commissioner’s wishes 
0 0  0 4 (25%) 12 (75%) 
Meet with MEPs  0 3 (21.4%) 10 (62.5%) 2 (14.3%) 1 (7.1%) 
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Meet advisers from other 
EC cabinets 
0% 0 0 7 (43.8%) 8 (50%) 
Represent the 
Commissioner in internal 
meetings  
0 0 2 (12.5%) 11 (68.8%) 3 (18.8%) 
Represent the 
Commissioner in public 
events 
0 3 (21.4%) 8 (50%) 5 (31.3%) 0 
Receive external 
delegations on the 
Commissioner’s behalf 
0 0 7 (43.8%) 7 (43.8%) 2 (12.5%) 
Raise new policy initiatives 
with the Commissioner 
0 0 4 (37.5%) 10 (62.5%) 2 (12.5%) 
 
The EC Cabinet adviser appears to be well aware of his/her political role  
“There is party politics around. Maybe not on every policy file, but on some important files there 
are clear political nuances. We have to remember that the EC is a political institution. It has to 
defend its line vis-à-vis the Parliament, which is aligned and divided in political parties. So, when it 
comes to pushing a file, it is natural for the Commissioner to go to his political group and ask for 
its support. So, it is part of the Commissioner’s job to also engage with the political parties. In this 
sense, the party of his/her own ‘colour’ is likely to be the Commissioner’s natural ally. However, 
he/she has to work with the other groups of the EP as well. On this purpose, various communication 
channels are used”. 
[Interview Respondent 3] 
 “The Adviser needs to have political experience and skills. This is more important than detailed 
policy knowledge” [Questionnaire respondent 12]. 
 
However, it would be premature to argue at this point that the average profile of the EC cabinet 
adviser is that of an always highly politically active agent. Their political role appears more variable 
as half of the advisers in our sample do not consider advice on political considerations as falling 
within their three top primary job functions. Whether active or not very much depends on the 
portfolio they are handling, but also the Commissioner  
“I believe it very much depends on the Commissioner’s personal choice. However, I find it more 
likely than unlikely that the Commissioner, at least for the people assigned with the management of 
the cabinet (i.e. Head/Deputy Head of cabinet), he/she will make sure that the political affiliation is 
the same as his/her own one. I personally know a few Head of cabinets who are probably more of 
an expert type of adviser. Of course, in these cases political affiliation is secondary. Nevertheless, it 
is not surprising that Commissioners also look at this issue”. 
[Interview Respondent 3] 
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Communication 
Having analysed the relevant data on the profile, policy and political role of EC cabinet advisers, we 
now proceed into analysing data concerning a fourth characteristic, their communication role. Does 
it reflect political or technical characteristics, or maybe both? On the more political side we already 
saw above (table 8) that all of the advisers surveyed appear to convey or clarify the Commissioner’s 
wishes, while the majority represents the Commissioner in internal meetings and half of them 
occasionally in public events too. Moreover, the majority meets advisers from other cabinets in 
order to coordinate policy and deal with cross-cutting issues that transcend the Commissioner’s 
portfolio boundaries. This political aspect of advisers’ communication role is further corroborated 
by their perception that “speaking in public” is an important and very important skill an EC cabinet 
adviser must possess. In addition, as one of our respondents pointed:  
“resilience (working under pressure and with incomplete information)” and “‘presentability’ 
(meetings with ministers, senior private sector representatives)” appear to be two valuable skills an 
adviser must possess in order to do the job properly  
[Questionnaire respondent 2]. 
Moving now to communication in its narrow sense and despite the fact that “Press and Media” staff 
have been deliberately left out of our investigation, we observe that “speech writing” is considered 
rather unimportant. However, paradoxically, it comes up as a type of text to which 10 out of 15 
advisers frequently and very frequently contribute. A lesser number, 7 advisers, contribute 
frequently and very frequently in writing up press-statements (table 7).  
Table 8: Frequency of contribution per type of text 
 Never Rarely 
(once a year) 
Occasionally 
(once a month) 
Frequently 
(once a week) 
Very 
frequently/
on a daily 
basis 
 Strategy 
Plans and 
Policy 
Reports 
0 1 (6.3%) 3 (18.8%) 8 (50%) 5 (25%) 
Policy 
Memos 
0 0 4 (25%) 6 (37.5%) 6 (37.5%) 
Legislative 
proposals 
0 3 (18.8%) 6 (37.5%) 3 (18.8%) 3 (18.8%) 
Speeches 0 1 (6.3%) 4 (25%) 6 (37.5%) 4 (25%) 
Press 
Statements 
0 3 (18.8%) 5 (31.3%) 6 (37.5%) 1 (6.3%) 
 
We see from the table above that contribution in strategy plans and policy reports, as well as policy 
memos is more frequent. This in turn reflects the technical side of advisers’ communication roles. 
This technical side of their communication role is also evident when we analyse the frequency of 
tasks performed. There we observe that all advisers in our sample appear to frequently and very 
frequently ask officials to provide memos or advice, they comment on the advice they receive, 
while the majority attends meetings with EC officials to talk about the nuts and bolts of policy 
(table 5).  To conclude, based on the data above it may be argued that the communication role of the 
EC cabinet adviser surveyed reflects both technical and political characteristics. 
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Impact 
Having analysed data on advisers’ profile, policy, political and communication roles we should now 
be able to analyse the final characteristic, crucial for the typology, advisers’ impact. Is the impact of 
EC cabinet advisers mainly expertise, politics, management or mutuality?  While in the Greek case 
the impact appeared quite clearly to be management, the picture here is rather blurry. Evidently 
their impact is not politics in the partisan definition of the term. On one hand, EC cabinet advisers 
appear to be highly qualified experts with significant previous policy work experience in the EU, 
and mainly the European Commission itself. However, the phenomenon of competence mobility / 
competence shifting means that they do not necessarily work in the policy field of their 
specialisation. They do give great emphasis, though, on acquiring and using knowledge for policy 
formulation. On the other hand, EC cabinet advisers seem to have a significant twofold impact: a) 
management, as they perform significant policy steering tasks. Here they are similar to their Greek 
counterparts. b) mutuality, as they are politically alert, looking actively for politically harmful 
issues to the Commissioner’s agenda.   
Conclusion: Experts, Minders, Co-ordinators or Partisans? 
Where does this all leave us in relation to Connaughton’s (2010b) typology? Our work would have 
been much easier if we were investigating EC special advisers. They most definitely fit the ideal 
type of the expert type of adviser. However, in relation to the EC core cabinet advisers, who are the 
focus of our investigation, the data in hand illustrate that there is no fixed type of adviser. Asking a 
member of cabinet to explicitly comment on the various types of advisers that may be present in the 
EC cabinet, we got the following answer: 
“I think we are all of them … I believe we perform all of the other three roles, depending on what is 
the case. For example, if we have a communication regarding some data on the economy, I am 
expected to be a minder, a coordinator and an expert as well. On a given day, I may do more of this 
or that type of function, but there will always be a mixture of all these roles”. 
[Interview Respondent 2] 
Indeed advisers perform multiple roles and this is in line with what we know from empirical 
research in other national administrative and executive traditions. In table 8 below we can see a 
summary of the characteristics of the EC cabinet adviser and how do these compare to those of their 
Greek counterparts. Interpreting the data we could argue that the advisers surveyed principally 
conform to a hybrid between the co-ordinator and the minder roles, projecting also strong elements 
of the expert type. This is different to the Greek case, where advisers appear to principally conform 
to the pure co-ordinator type.   
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Table 9: Classification of EC cabinet adviser according to policy role 
Cabinet 
System 
PROFILE POLITICAL COMMUNICA
TE 
POLICY 
MAKING 
IMPACT ROLE 
  
EC 
  
Generalist (co-
ordinator), but 
highly 
qualified 
experts with 
significant EC 
experience 
(co-ordinator) 
  
Variable (co-
ordinator) 
  
Communicate 
both in technical 
and political 
terms (co-
ordinator) 
  
Value 
knowledge and 
technical policy 
side (expert), 
but also strong 
fixer element 
(co-ordinator 
Hybrid: expert / 
co-ordinator 
  
Impact is 
expertise 
(expert) and 
management 
(co-
ordinator), 
but also 
mutuality 
(minder) 
  
Hybrid  
Coordinator 
and minder 
with 
elements of 
the expert 
type 
Greece Generalist Variable Both political 
and technical 
Fixer Management Coordinato
r 
 
 
 
4.2 Dimension of advice: the three arenas 
We now move on to examine the arenas in which advisers’ policy work is more pronounced. The 
question here is the following: which arena(s) constitutes the core part of their work and which 
represents more of an opportunity than responsibility? Working with the department (1
st
 arena), 
working within the executive (2
nd
 arena) or working with stakeholders (3
rd
 arena) (Maley 2013)? 
The overview of the frequency of tasks performed in each of the three arenas (table 9) shows that 
except for working with the department (1
st
 arena) and within the executive (2
nd
 arena), working 
also with stakeholders forms core part of the advisers’ policy role.  
Table 10: Frequency of tasks performed in the three arenas 
Arenas Tasks Never Rarely Occasionally 
  
Frequently  
  
Very 
frequently 
  
1
sr
 a
re
n
a
: 
w
o
rk
in
g
 w
it
h
 
th
e 
d
ep
a
rt
m
en
t 
 
V
er
ti
ca
l 
A
re
n
a
 
Ask officials to provide 
memos or advice  
0  0 0 7 (50%) 7 (50%) 
Convey or clarify 
Commissioner’s wishes 
0 0 (0%) 0 4 (28.6%) 10 (71.4%) 
Attend meetings with 
European Commission’s 
DG Civil Servants to 
discuss the nuts and bolts 
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 3 (21.4%) 7(50%) 4(28.6%) 
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of policy 
Represent the 
Commissioner in internal 
meetings  
0 0 2 (12.5%) 11 (68.8%) 3 (18.8%) 
 
Read & comment on the 
administration’s (DGs) 
advice 
0 0 1 (6.3%) 8 (50%) 7 (43.8%) 
2
n
d
 a
re
n
a
: 
w
o
rk
in
g
 
w
it
h
in
 t
h
e 
ex
ec
u
ti
v
e 
 
In
tr
a
-e
x
e
cu
ti
v
e 
co
o
rd
in
a
ti
o
n
 
Meet advisers from other 
EC cabinets 
0% 0 0 6 (42.9%) 7 (50%) 
3
r
d
 a
re
n
a
: 
w
o
rk
in
g
 w
it
h
 s
ta
k
eh
o
ld
er
s 
 
 
H
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l 
A
re
n
a
 
Meet with MEPs  0 3 (21.4%) 8 (57,1%) 2 (14.3%) 1 (7.1%) 
Broker meetings with 
interest groups   
0 1 (7.1%) 5 (35.7%) 6 (42.9%) 2 (14.3%) 
Meet with other EU 
institutions officials to 
coordinate policy  
0 (0%) 0 8 (57,1%) 3 (21.4%) 1 (7.1%) 
Receive external 
delegations on the 
Commissioner’s behalf 
0 0 7 (50%) 5 (35.7%) 2 (14.3%) 
Represent the 
Commissioner in public 
events 
0 3 (18.8%) 8 (50%) 5 (31.3%) 0 
 
To begin with, as expected in all systems, working with the department makes up indeed the thrust 
of advisers’ work. We already saw the technical and political aspects of EC advisers’ some of 
which are depicted in table 10 above. In respect to supervising, orienting, mobilising and 
developing ideas within the department a member of cabinet commented:  
[…] we are in daily contact with the Directors-General and the Directors. […] In practice, cabinets 
can impose certain positions to the services, encourage the initiation of a policy draft or express 
their disapproval of the scope of a given proposal. This is day-to-day business for us’. 
 
[Interview Respondent 1] 
Asked to comment on the top-down and bottom-up generation of policy ideas another member of 
cabinet replied:  
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“Sometimes proposals find their way bottom-up, while sometimes the Commissioner distinguishes a 
priority and tries to push it in a top-down manner. On the one side, there are these weekly meetings 
between the services and the cabinets where we basically discuss the most salient issues and get 
bottom-up policy advice. On the other side, the Head of a cabinet, representing the Commissioner, 
can encourage the launch of an initiative and ask for the opinion of the civil service, i.e. write a 
note. Finally, top-down and bottom-up approaches co-exist, without excluding each other.” 
[Interview Respondent 3] 
In addition, as we can observe from the frequency of meetings with other advisers, working within 
the executive is also part of the core policy work of EC cabinet advisers. This is in line with what 
we know on the decision-making and co-ordination mechanisms inside the Commission, whereby 
the “Commissioners’ agenda is always considered at a weekly meeting of the heads of the 
Commissioners’ cabinets” while “feeding into chefs de cabinet meetings are the outcomes of 
meetings between the cabinet members responsible for particular policy areas” (Nugent 2010, p. 
120). Indeed our interviews corroborated this. 
“There are regular meetings among advisers and every Monday the chefs de cabinet meet in order 
to prepare the meeting of the College of Commissioners that takes place every Wednesday”   
[Exploratory Interview with Policy Assistant] 
Where the EC cabinet system appears to differ to the Greek, but also the Australian case, is in 
relation to working with stakeholders. In the EC cabinet context, working with stakeholders in order 
to bargain, link ideas to interests and opportunities, and build political support, appears to represent 
an institutional responsibility, rather than just an opportunity that advisers can grab according to 
their individual capacity and background.  
Asking a member of cabinet to comment on working within the executive and in particularly 
stakeholders we got the following reply 
“Our cabinet interacts with a wide range of actors. We usually get a huge amount of requests to 
meet with stakeholders, to deliver speeches on behalf of the Commissioner, to represent him/her in 
a political context in the EP, at workshop level with MEPs etc. I think it is one of the prime tasks 
and this is why cabinets should be composed of people who are able to perform in public.” 
[Interview Respondent 3] 
This finding is further corroborated by the value our sample of respondents attach to “negotiation” 
as fundamental skill an adviser must possess in order to be successful in the job. 12 out of the 16 
advisers of our sample consider it a very important and most important skill. Moreover, half of the 
advisers in our sample consider “networking with other EU institutions” as either a very or most 
important skill.  
Central to the role of co-ordination is the head of cabinet who appears to play a major negotiating, 
brokering and bargaining role in all three arenas. As a member of cabinet put it:  
“the major coordinating role is performed by the head of cabinet: he is the responsinble for the 
communication between the Commissioner and the cabinet, the internal coordination of the cabinet 
and the interactions with the other cabinets” 
[Interview Respondent 1] 
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Conclusion 
In the present study we investigated the phenomenon of EC cabinet advisers in the policy making 
process. We started by employing an institutional focus, describing the institutional habitat of those 
agents, the EC cabinet, as well as the politico-administrative context in which the EC cabinet is 
embedded. We proceeded by focusing on the individual agents’ policy work. First, we briefly 
highlighted the policy cycle stage where advisers’ work is more prominent, and we then proceeded 
with classifying EC advisers’ policy work using Connaughton’s (2010a, 2010b) 4 adviser types and 
Maley’s (2013) three arenas.  
 
On the institutional front, we observed that EC advisers belong to cabinets and that the EC cabinet 
model shares important similarities with other ministerial cabinet systems, like that of France, the 
model of which was followed by practitioners in the early Commission, but also those of Belgium, 
and Greece. On the similarities front, we see that EC cabinets:  
 
 Were established in particular historical and political circumstances as institutions that could 
promote a dynamic and fluid system of policy advice. Much like in other systems their main 
functions were co-ordination and the combination of the pooling of expertise with political 
feasibility. To be more specific they were set up to improve both horizontal and vertical co-
ordination within the Commission, emphasize the political role the Commission was to play 
in the creation of European political union, act as pools of expertise, as well as build policy 
majorities and package deals across Community institutions and with the Member States.   
 Employ flexibility in relation to their exact organisation, allocation of tasks and internal 
division of labour.  
 Are big as far as total cabinet staff numbers are concerned: bigger than Belgium, but smaller 
than Greece and France  
 Play a key role in the provision of policy advice just like their French, Belgian and Greek 
counterparts. EC Cabinets are “central to policy making and political processes of the 
Community” and as such operate within a complex web of European “institutions and are a 
focus of lobbying from sectoral and national interests” (Donelly and Ritchie 1994, p. 40).  
 
Yet, the important changes implemented after the Prodi – Kinnock reform, combined with the 
particularities of the EU supranational administration, have resulted to the EC cabinet system 
projecting certain fundamental differences.  
 
 To begin with, contrary to total cabinet size, the number of core cabinet advisers is 
significantly smaller than that of the French, the Belgian and the Greek ones.  
 The establishment of Codes of Conduct, a practice developed and usually found in 
Westminster systems, has been adopted as a way to draw a sharp line of responsibility 
between cabinets and services 
 Unlike any other system, there are strict restraints regarding the composition of EC cabinets 
in terms of nationality and gender balance. “Party politics plays hardly and national politics 
little role” (Bauer and Ege 2013, p. 185). 
 While they demand political responsiveness and the Commission high civil service does 
come as politically aware and professionally politicised, EC cabinets are not any more the 
source of direct politicisation as this the case with most ministerial cabinet systems. The 
Commission administration appears “considerably depoliticised”, “an ever less politicised 
civil service, in an ever more politicised organisational context” (Bauer and Ege 2013, p. 
193). This is what has been described as a “normalised executive” (Wille 2013). 
 
This particular political/administrative context, reflected in the particular EC cabinet arrangements 
does have implications for the role of EC Cabinet advisers in policy making. Focusing now on the 
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individual roles of those agents we observe that as expected in a ministerial cabinet system, advisers 
are highly active at all stages of the policy cycle. However, EC cabinet advisers do not dominate the 
policy process to the same extent that Greek ministerial advisers do, and to a certain extent also 
their Belgian or French counterparts, through the establishment of ‘mini’ or ‘shadow’ 
administrations. Thus the role of cabinets in the provision of policy advice is key, but not absolute. 
As Bauer and Ege (2013, p. 186) argued “Commission officials at all levels are ex officio involved 
in EU policy making”. This was corroborated by our interview data according to which policy 
development appeared to be both a top down and bottom up process. 
 
When it comes to classifying advisers’ policy making roles, we observed that there is no fixed type 
of adviser. Based on the data in hand the advisers surveyed appear to principally conform to a 
hybrid between the co-ordinator and the minder roles, projecting also strong elements of the expert 
type. This is different to the Greek case, where advisers appear to principally conform to the pure 
co-ordinator type. In terms of profile, the EC cabinet adviser is an expert with significant previous 
work experience in the EU and especially the European Commission, but not necessarily a 
specialist, since s/he most often works in portfolios different than the field of specialisation. In this, 
the EC Cabinet adviser shares important similarities with the French members of cabinet, especially 
the seconded civil servant and ENA graduate to be found in abundance in the French Cabinets 
Ministériels, but also the Belgian competence shifters. In Greece too, we observe the phenomenon 
of competence mobility, though, in the Greek case the cabinet’s balance tilts towards younger and 
less experienced outsiders. In the EC cabinet system, the only specialists, also fitting the ideal type 
of Connaughton’s expert type in every other dimension are Special Advisers. Those actors, though, 
work outside the cabinet system and they have not been the focus of the present study. In relation to 
their policy role we observed that the EC cabinet adviser’s work projects both steering and technical 
characteristics valuing both the injection of knowledge, as well as performing a role of “political 
watchdog”. Their political role is variable, depending on their background, portfolio and the 
Commissioner, while their communication role appears to share both political and technical 
elements.  Finally, their impact appears to be primarily co-ordination, followed by mutuality and 
expertise.  
As far as the dimension of advisers’ work is concerned, working with the department (1st arena) is 
obviously a core part of EC cabinet advisers’ policy work. Supervision, orientation, mobilisation 
and development of policy is key. An important difference to advisers in other ministerial cabinet 
systems, is that the EC adviser does not command and control the administration. This makes the 
EC the only cabinet system in which this type of hierarchical command and control activity is 
particularly weak. This is turn positions EC advisers to the exact opposite of their American 
counterparts. While US advisers are the only non-cabinet system advisers to command and control 
the administration, EC cabinet advisers are the cabinet system advisers not to do this (OECD 2011, p. 
30).      
Moreover, as expected, our data shows that working within the executive is also a core part of 
advisers’ policy work. This is consistent with a fundamental trait we find in ministerial cabinet 
systems: intra-executive co-ordination. As James (2007, p. 17) pointed cabinets facilitate inter-
ministerial policy co-ordination, thanks to the formation of a strong network between cabinets. 
Referring to France, he points to the fact the cabinet staff settle inter-ministerial disagreements. In 
Belgium too cabinet staff serves as conduits of negotiating important policy decisions between 
ministers (Brans and Steen 2007). In the case of the EC, the bureaucracy of which has been 
described as extremely fragmented and with crucial co-ordination deficits, cabinet advisers are the 
main nods that appear to tie the system together.    
Finally, in contrast to other systems, working with stakeholders appears to be an institutional 
responsibility for the EC cabinet adviser rather than simply an opportunity those actors can grab at 
will. We saw that the policy advice giving activities of the EC cabinet adviser reach out to a 
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complex web of interest groups and stakeholders. This in turn can be explained by the nature of 
lobbying, the logic of granting access to interest groups and the pattern of interest representation at 
the EU level. To begin with, interest groups and stakeholders seek to gain access to and influence 
the main EU institutions: the European Commission, the Council of Ministers and increasingly the 
European Parliament. Traditionally, the European Commission, and particularly lower civil servants 
who undertake most of the policy preparatory work at an early stage and have technical know-how, 
have been the main focus of lobbying activities. However, the Commissioner, the cabinet and high 
civil servants are also the targets of ad hoc high level lobbying. Lobbying, though, is not a 
unidirectional activity of interest groups versus the EU institutions, but it can be better seen as the 
exchange of resources between interdependent organizations. Interest groups seek access and 
influence, but EU institutions also want to interact with stakeholders, having as their goal the 
acquisition of information and knowledge, as well as building of support and legitimacy for the 
proposed policy. This is the logic of access described by Bouwen (2002, 2004, 2009). Finally, it 
may be argued that this logic of access is interlinked to an EU system of interest representation, 
which with the exception of social policy, can be better described as either neo-pluralist or elite 
pluralist (Hix, 2005, Coen 1997). In relation to the former, unlike corporatism, there is no privileged 
access of certain groups, but officials activate the relevant interest(s) in a specific policy issue. This 
happens through financial support or the use of informal rules and guidelines, such as the recent 
European Transparency Initiative. In relation to elite pluralism, interest groups and stakeholders are 
activated through committees and small expert groups (committee governance), hearings or 
roundtables, and institutionalised consultation fora (forum politics).  
Where does it all leave us then in terms of empirically studying and theorising advisers and their 
policy making roles? In terms of empirics and not disregarding the limitation of the present work 
being still a work in progress, it can be argued that a first step in the direction of covering the 
empirical gap concerning EC cabinet advisers has been taken. In terms of theory the use of 
typologies has allowed us to reach a higher level of abstraction and also draw meaningful 
comparisons with other systems at this level. Important gaps left by the typology were covered by 
the employment of the policy cycle heuristic and Maley’s (2013) concept of three arenas. However, 
despite reaching greater specificity through the use of various theoretical and empirical approaches, 
we still lack a single conceptual approach, able to weave the study of advisers together and as such 
facilitate a more methodological comparative study.  
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